Most parents divide their bequests equally among their children, while inter-vivos transfers are usually unequal. We propose that exchange works better for inducing inter-vivos transfers than bequests. Inter-vivos transfers can be adjusted quickly to the amount of care, are less costly than writing a will, and can be kept secret from other family members and the public. The results from national longitudinal data show that, as expected, if a parent gives any inter-vivos transfers, she is more likely to give to children who provide informal care. Informal care has no effect on the equality of intended bequests.
Introduction
Economists have long looked for evidence of exchange as a motive for bequests.
The theoretical literature on bequests argues that parents reward children who provide informal care and attention with a larger bequest (Bernheim, Schleifer, and Summers 1985; Bernheim 1991) . The empirical evidence, however, is mixed, with some papers finding bequests positively associated with attention (Bernheim, Schleifer, and Summers 1985; Bernheim 1991) , and others not finding evidence of exchange (Sloan and Norton 1997; Perozek 1999) .
One stylized fact is that although the burden of informal caregiving falls disproportionately on some children, most bequests are divided equally. Menchik (1980) studied probate records from 1,050 wealthy estates in Connecticut filed between 1931 -1948 . Tomes (1981 1988 ) used a random sample of probate records drawn from Cleveland, Ohio in 1967. Both researchers based their test of altruism on the idea that equal division of an estate is evidence against altruism unless all children have an identical marginal utility of income. Menchik found that roughly 80% of the Connecticut estates were divided equally. Tomes found that just under half of those in Cleveland were so divided. However, Menchik (1988) suggested that Tomes was in error and the rate of equal division was over 90% when he tried to replicate the Cleveland study. There was a fundamental difference in how the data were selected for the two studies. Menchik (1980) used probate records as the sole source of data, while the Tomes (1988) sample relied on individual recall. Using linked income and estate tax returns, Wilhelm (1996) found that the majority of wealthy decedents divide their estate equally among their children, using federal estate tax returns. Norton and Taylor (2004) found that between 70 and 83 percent of probate records studied in North Carolina were divided equally.
Unlike bequests, inter-vivos transfers are much more likely to be divided unequally among children. We find that the majority of parents who make inter-vivos transfers do so unequally. Why should inter-vivos transfers have such a different pattern than bequests? Recently economists have turned their attention from bequests to inter-vivos transfers. Empirical research on intervivos transfers has looked for evidence of the same two motives presumed to drive bequests, exchange and altruism. Altruism is when parents equalize their children's marginal utility of wealth by giving more bequests to their poorer children (Wilhelm 1996; Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff 1997; Sloan, Zhang, and Wang, 2002) . Exchange is when parents give more bequests to the child or children who provide more informal care and attention. The empirical literature on motives for inter-vivos transfers is less extensive than for bequests motives, but has repeatedly found evidence of altruism (Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff 1997; McGarry and Schoeni 1997; McGarry 1999) . The remarkably different pattern of giving between inter-vivos transfers and bequests-primarily unequal or primarily equal-suggests that the strategic interaction between parents and children may be different for these two methods of passing wealth to the next generation.
We argue that there are compelling reasons why exchange is a common and important motivation for inter-vivos transfers, and furthermore that exchange is a better strategic incentive when done through transfers than through bequests.
Transfers can be adjusted quickly to the amount of informal care and attention actually provided, are less costly than writing a will, and can be kept secret from other family members and the public. Transfers are a more targeted, less expensive, and far more flexible way to exchange wealth for informal care and attention. Therefore, it is not surprising that inter-vivos transfers are common and are often unequally divided.
We test our hypotheses by estimating whether children of parents who make any transfers are more likely to receive a transfer if they provide informal care, and also whether parents intend to divide their bequest evenly given different contributions of informal care. Informal care provides a good test for exchange because, unlike some measures of attention, it involves a serious commitment on the part of children in time and effort, and varies among children within a family. We use data from the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the OldestOld Panel Survey (AHEAD) because it has information on both parents and children, and about transfers, intended bequests, informal care, and finances.
Informal care is endogenous because forward-thinking children will decide how much informal care to provide simultaneously with their parents deciding on transfers and bequests. We test and control for the endogeneity of informal care. As expected, parents who give any transfers are more likely to give to children who provide informal care. The model is identified through variation in the amount of informal care provided by children in families.
Our results support exchange as a motivation for inter-vivos transfers, but not for intended bequests. A child who helps with activities of daily living or instrumental activities of daily living increases their probability of receiving a transfer of at least $500 in a year by eleven to fourteen percentage points. Our test has the advantage over previous tests of using child-level data matched to parents' data; this allows us to test for differences in informal care within families.
Background
Exchange has long been proposed as a motivation for bequests (Bernheim, Schleifer, and Summers 1985; Bernheim 1991) . Under exchange, adult children provide informal care and attention to their elderly parents in exchange for a larger bequest. Exchange has great intuitive appeal as a motive for be-quests because elderly persons often have a need for informal care, a desire for attention from their children, and wealth to bequeath. Hundreds of billions of dollars are bequeathed each year in the United States (Wilhelm 1996) . Adult children provide the most informal care to elderly parents who are not married. Among married and unmarried elderly, child caregivers (41.3 percent of all caregivers) are more numerous than spousal caregivers (23.4 percent) (Spector 2000) . Moreover, the burden of providing informal care is not generally divided equally among the children. Exchange is not the only motive for bequests; other reasons include altruism, accidental bequests through uncertainty in life expectancy, and precautionary savings.
Inter-vivos transfers from parents to children are common, although the exact extent is notoriously difficult to estimate. Inter-vivos transfers are believed to be at least one-third of all intergenerational transfers (see Gale and Scholz (1994) , for a review), meaning hundreds of billions of dollars per year. In a study of non-elderly parents and children using the 1988 Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, Altonji and colleagues found that 20 percent of children received a transfer of $100 or more in a year's time, and that the mean transfer was $297 (Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff 1997) . Using a nationally representative sample of the elderly, McGarry (1999) found that 25 percent of families made a cash transfer to at least one child. The mean transfer was $3,013 over the past ten years. Using the same data set, AHEAD, as McGarry we find that transfers tend to be made unequally among children, unlike bequests. Over 60 percent of parents who made inter-vivos transfers did so unequally, meaning that at least one child received money and at least one did not. This estimate is conservative because we counted a transfer as equal when all children received some transfers, not knowing if the actual size of transfers was equal.
There are several empirical studies of motives for inter-vivos transfers. Cox (1987) uses data from 1979 on intergenerational households to test how the child's income affects both the probability and amount of transfer. Cox develops a model of altruism and exchange that focuses on the effects of income on transfers. Although he finds evidence in support of exchange, he is not able measure directly whether increased care and attention affects transfers. Altonji and colleagues (1997) look at transfers to non-resident children among parents already actively making transfers, controlling for unobserved family heterogeneity and sample selection bias. They examine transfer behavior when a child's income increases and a parent's decreases by equivalent amounts. If altruism exists, the income change should induce a parent to reduce his or her transfer to that child by nearly the entire amount of the increase. They soundly reject the altruism hypothesis, because, while parents increase their transfers when their own income goes up, consistent with altruism, parents reduce their transfers by only a few cents for each extra dollar of income their child has. They do not examine exchange, although a more recent study by the same authors (2000) examines time and money transfers exchanged both ways between parents and children. They find little evidence in the 1988 PSID that time transfers are exchanged for money in either direction, or that income or wealth increases money transfers in either direction.
McGarry (1999) develops a model that explains the observed facts that intervivos transfers are given disproportionately to poorer children, while bequests are usually divided equally. She predicts that parents with liquidity-constrained children and uncertainty about their permanent income will give transfers unequally, but bequests equally, and she finds empirical evidence to support this using data from the HRS and AHEAD. In a similar study, McGarry and Schoeni (1997) find that parents are more likely to make a financial transfer to children in the lowest income category, and that these children receive over $300 more than children in the highest income category. They also test for exchange, and find that parents do not provide financial assistance to their children in exchange for caregiving. They surmise that current financial transfers are investments which parents hope will be paid off by the child when help is needed in the future.
Our study differs from theirs in several important ways. First, we develop a conceptual framework to explain why inter-vivos transfers would be used for exchange instead of bequests. Second, we use two waves of AHEAD data instead of one, which gives us more variation over time within families. Third, we obtain identification from within-family variation in informal caregiving, instead of cross sectional variation, and thereby have better controls for unobserved heterogeneity. Fourth, we control for endogeneity of informal caregiving. Fifth, we estimate models of intended bequests.
In another related study, Henretta and colleagues (1997) use the same data (AHEAD) to study whether past transfers increase current caregiving-the opposite relationship that we study. They also use family fixed effects models to exploit within family variation in past transfers and current caregiving. Henretta and colleagues find a positive and significant relationship, as expected. Clearly, children also may engage in exchange by providing informal care for intangible gains, not only for present or future monetary rewards through transfers or bequests. Caregiving is physically and emotionally difficult, and while bequest amounts may be substantial, annual monetary transfers from parents are usually much less than what a child would earn in a full-time minimum-wage job. Some of the intangible gains of caregiving include relief that a parent can remain in her own home as desired; satisfaction at being able to repay a parent for all of the effort it took to raise the child; happiness associated with a closer relationship with a parent; fulfilling different cultural norms about the way el-ders should be treated; or setting an example for their children (grandchildren of the elderly parent) for how the adult child would like to be treated eventually.
Nevertheless, exchange for monetary transfers may be vital to children. At the margin, receiving monetary transfers may help reassure a child that they are doing the right thing by caring for a parent. It may alleviate the stresses of caring for a parent, the financial sacrifice of being a caregiver, or in some other way induce a child to continue to provide care.
Theoretical Framework
If a parent wants to elicit more informal care and attention from one child, is it better to use inter-vivos transfers or bequests? Although the published theoretical literature suggests that exchange is an important motive for bequests (Bernheim, Schleifer, and Summers 1985; Bernheim 1991) , we argue that it is an even stronger motive for inter-vivos transfers. There are three reasons why parents are more likely to use inter-vivos transfers than bequests for exchange.
First, inter-vivos transfers provide a stronger link between the amount of informal care and the amount of the transfer. Assume that the parent gets utility from informal care, which depends on both inter-vivos transfers and bequest from the parent to the child. A parent can transfer an amount commensurate with the level of informal care each year using periodic inter-vivos transfers (up to $10,000 per child per year without a child incurring taxes on the transfer).
Although a parent could use bequests, the marginal effect of a dollar of extra bequest on the supply of informal care is less than for a dollar of transfer. A dollar of bequest may be worth less because of several sources of uncertainty.
The parent could change the will on a whim, eliminating the extra bequest. The parent could die with no assets, perhaps after a long, expensive illness. In either of these cases, a child who invested time and effort in informal care would receive no bequest (we know that there are non-pecuniary reasons to provide informal care to parents, but these two examples show why the monetary incentives are weaker for bequests than transfers.) In addition, if a child explicitly provides informal care in return for an extra bequest, it is uncertain how long the parent will live. The payoff will generally be less if the parent lives longer because she will consume out of savings, reducing the bequest. Therefore, uncertainty in life expectancy means that the bequest may be inversely proportional to the amount of informal care provided. Parents who expect to live for a long time will be even more likely to use transfers than bequests to elicit informal care and attention. Risk-averse children have a higher marginal effect on the supply of informal care. Furthermore, liquidity constrained children prefer cash now to future bequests. On the basis of incentives, transfers are preferred to extra bequests because risk-averse children will provide more informal care for a dollar of transfer compared to the expected value of a dollar of extra bequests, discounted for time but not risk.
Second, it is far less expensive to change the terms of an inter-vivos transfer than to rewrite a will. A parent can increase transfers as easily as writing a check, and decrease transfers by doing nothing. In contrast, the cost of writing, or rewriting, a simple will with a lawyer is typically several hundred dollars, but may be much more expensive for a will with more terms and conditions. An additional consideration is that if the child expecting an extra bequest knows that rewriting a will is costly, she can shirk on providing informal care and attention and still get the extra bequest. On the basis of legal costs, the marginal benefit of transfers on utility is higher than for the marginal benefit of extra bequests.
Third, inter-vivos transfers to one child can be done without the knowledge or scrutiny of other children. Bernheim and Severinov (2003) argue that parents prefer to be seen as loving their children equally. Because the will is typically revealed to all children (and to the public if the estate goes to probate court), unequal bequests may be seen as indication of unequal love. In contrast, intervivos transfers can be made without other children knowing. The desire to be seen as loving equally makes parents reluctant to allow small deviations from equality from being reflected in the will. For example, an altruistic parent who wants to give a greater bequest to one child must balance the disutility of unequal bequests with the altruistic desire to balance marginal utility of wealth.
On the basis of wanting to be seen as loving children equally, the marginal benefit of transfers is higher than for extra bequests.
In summary, a parent who wants to use money to increase the amount of informal care and attention she receives should use transfers, not extra bequests.
Inter-vivos transfers have greater incentive value, cost less, and can be kept secret from other children. This framework suggests three hypotheses about how exchange will affect inter-vivos transfers. First, the probability of an intervivos transfer will increase when a child provides informal care. We test this with child-level data to see if children who provide more informal care are more likely to receive transfers. Second, the preference for transfers is stronger for younger parents because they expect to live longer and therefore there is more financial uncertainty with bequests. This can also be tested with child-level data, by comparing the magnitude of the results across samples stratified by parent's age. Third, informal caregiving is not a significant predictor of expected unequal bequests. We test this using household-level data.
The empirical part of this study will focus on informal care, not attention, although conceptually either one could be part of exchange. Informal care is easier to measure, and involves more effort and time on the part of the child.
Attention has been defined to include making phone calls and visiting, which involve comparatively less time and effort.
Methods
The conceptual framework leads to an empirical model in which informal care is an endogenous predictor of inter-vivos transfers. Parents offer inter-vivos transfers to children in exchange for informal care, which is determined simultaneously with the inter-vivos transfers. We estimate the model using child-level data to ascertain whether a sibling who provides informal care is more likely to receive a transfer compared to a sibling who does not provide informal care.
The methods for dealing with endogeneity are described after the main model.
We test for exchange in intended bequests using household-level data. If parents receive informal care from any child, it is very likely that they received it from only one child because very few parents have more than one child caregiver.
Hence, the effect of informal care on intended equal division of bequests offers a test of exchange. If parents who receive informal care are less likely to divide their bequests equally, that is evidence in favor of exchange in bequests. For the many reasons discussed in the theoretical framework, exchange behavior is not expected to be as strong for bequests as for inter-vivos transfers.
The probability of an inter-vivos transfer depends on informal care, but also on household and child characteristics. Households with higher income and wealth will be more likely to transfer money to their children. Besides measures of household income and wealth we control for demographics and education.
Child characteristics include education, income, age, whether a child is a step child, number of the child's own children, and whether the child lives more than 10 miles away from the parent. The general relationship posed by our model is Pr (transfer hkt ) = β 0 + β 1 informal care hkt + β 2 household ht +β 3 child kt + fe h + ε hkt where the dependent variable is the probability of an inter-vivos transfer from household h to child k in period t, informal care is the endogenous variable indicating informal care provided by a child, household is a vector of household characteristics, child is a vector of child characteristics, the βs are parameters to be estimated, fe are household-level fixed effects, and ε is the random error term.
The intended bequest model is very similar, except that it is tested on a household-level data set, and the dependent variable is whether the parent intends to divide the bequest equally. The general form is Pr (equal intended bequest ht ) = γ 0 + γ 1 informal care ht + γ 2 household ht +γ 3 child ht + η ht where informal care indicates care received from any child, and η is a random error term. The vector child includes the mean (or in some cases the difference between the maximum and the minimum) of sibling characteristics.
The main equations for both the inter-vivos transfer and bequest models are estimated using a logit model, with either household fixed effects or robust standard errors that control for clustering at the household level.
Prior theoretical research implies that informal care is endogenous in models of parent's health care utilization (Greene, 1983 ). If children determine their level of informal care simultaneously with parents' decisions to give inter-vivos transfers, then informal care is endogenous. If there are unobservable influences on the likelihood of a transfer that are positively correlated with unobservable influences on a child's provision of informal care, such as the strength of the parent-child relationship, then this will exert a positive bias to the coefficient on informal care. However, the endogeneity bias could be negative. For example, parent's permanent income is positively related to transfers but makes informal care less likely, so any unobserved part of permanent income would lead to negative bias. If informal care is endogenous, then ignoring the endogeneity will bias the coefficient on informal care in the main equation.
We use two main approaches to control for the endogeneity in the equations to predict inter-vivos transfers, and three approaches to predict intended bequests. First, household fixed effects control for any time-invariant householdlevel variables that are omitted and correlated with informal care (Wong, Kitayama, and Soldo 1999) . Examples include unmeasured permanent income or wealth, the strength of the parent's relationship with her children, and propensity to plan ahead financially. A simple correlation between caregiving and wealth shows that those who provide care are less likely to receive transfers.
The reason is that wealth drives both caregiving and probability of transfers, but in opposite directions. As household wealth increases, the probability of caregiving declines and the probability of transfers increases. In the lowest wealth quintile, the probability of caregiving is 39%, and the probability of transfers is 5%. In the highest wealth quintile, the probability of caregiving is 5%, and the probability of transfers is 16%. Household fixed effects breaks the confounding effect of household wealth. One reason that we restricted the sample to children in families in which there is at least one child who provided informal care is because any elderly household that gave no inter-vivos transfer to any children (i.e., there is no within-household variation in the dependent variable) falls out of the fixed-effects model. Although we tried to estimate child fixed effects models, the fixed effects remove too many observations because of lack of variation in the dependent variable over two waves. Therefore, we use household fixed effects in both the transfer model and the bequest model. We also tried household-year fixed effects, and found qualitatively similar results.
The household fixed effects should eliminate the endogeneity bias due to omitted time-invariant household-level variables, but we also used lagged values of informal caregiving, which will be less endogenous than current values by eliminating endogeneity from reverse causation. Lagged values can still be endogenous, however, if the error terms are serially correlated (Stern 1994; Stern 1995) . Although some endogeneity from lagged values may persist either through standard endogeneity bias, or selection bias by conditioning on the prior wave, Stern argues that these biases are likely to be small if the serial correlation is small. The correlation is less than .12 in absolute value. We therefore run regressions using the second wave of data and caregiving from the first wave, along with household fixed effects. The disadvantage of this is that the sample size is smaller, leading to less precise estimates. In addition, we used instrumental variables to instrument for informal caregiving, although good instruments are hard to find and the household fixed effects models are our preferred models. We used standard statistical tests to decide whether the decrease in bias is worth the increase in variance in the instrumental variable model (Bollen, Guilkey, and Mroz 1995) .
We present both single-equation and instrumental variables models, along with models with fixed effects and with lagged endogenous variables, for completeness. Because the instrumental variables models lead to imprecise coefficient estimates, the household fixed effects model remains our preferred model. In addition to estimating logit models as the main equation, we also estimated linear probability models, and reran all the specification tests. The qual-itative results are nearly the same for the logit and linear probability model, and the specification tests all reach the same conclusions. In summary, we control for the endogeneity of informal care with household fixed effects, which will sweep away endogeneity bias due to unobserved time-invariant household factors. These important factors include permanent wealth, strength of relationships with children, and the propensity to plan ahead. Other ways to control for any remaining bias increases the standard errors, and, as we show later, lead to similar empirical results. We restrict the original child-level sample of households with at least two living non-resident children (including step-children). We exclude households with fewer than two children to focus on within-family variation in informal caregiving, instead of cross-section variation. Following McGarry (1999) co-resident children are excluded from the child-level analysis, because co-resident children may give and receive in-kind transfers, and these transfers are of unknown value.
Data
Excluding co-resident children avoids measurement error in both dependent and independent variables, and makes the comparison cleaner. The child-level data set has 25,723 non-resident children in households with at least two children.
Because we estimate models with household fixed effects, the empirical model is identified from transfer behavior among children within the same family. In a household fixed-effects model the sample is limited to children of parents who gave a transfer to at least one child, but not all children. The final sample size is 4,872. The dependent variable is whether a parent in the household gave at least $500 in the last year to a child (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). Ten percent of parents of children in the sample of 25,723 gave such a monetary transfer to at least one of their children, with more than half of children in our final sample receiving a transfer.
At the household level the sample is composed of households with at least two living children (including step-children), or 7,690 households. Co-resident children must be included for the analysis of intended bequests, because a parent may expect to divide her estate unequally if she lives with one of her children.
To exclude co-resident children would stack the deck against finding exchange.
Of the eligible households, 4,429 reported having a will and gave information on whether they intended to split the will equally. The dependent variable is whether or not the household intended to divide its will equally among all children. Approximately 95 percent of households intended to divide its will equally among children.
The explanatory variable of primary interest in both the transfer and bequest models is the receipt of informal care. Our measure of informal care at the child level is whether or not a child provided any informal care to a parent in each wave. Three percent of children provided informal care (see Table 1 ); 79 percent of parents who receive informal care receive it from just one child. This variation in caregiving within the family identifies the parameter of interest, because we estimate models with household fixed effects. At the household level, the measure of informal care is whether either parent in the household received informal care from any of his or her children. About 10 percent of parents received informal care from at least one of their children. Because we include co-resident children in the household level analyses, we include a second measure of informal care, being a co-resident child. Presumably, co-resident children provide some informal caregiving to their parents, but the extent is not known. We controlled for the endogeneity of co-resident with fixed effects, but did not try to find instruments for this variable, because it was not the variable of primary interest.
Variables measuring parent characteristics are joint for the household in both the transfer model and the bequest model. Therefore, there is no control for gender. The average minimum age of household members is about 75; we control for the minimum age to reflect the longest expected planning horizon between married couples. The vast majority of households are white, and half of households are comprised of married couples (this is conditional on having at least two nonresident living child, so the percentage of married is higher than the general elderly population). Similarly, the average number of children per household is 4.4 in the child-level data (this is reasonable because elderly with less than two children were eliminated from the sample). We selected the highest level of education in the parent's household, which averaged around 12 years. About seven percent of either parents self-report being in poor health status, and we include this following McGarry (1999) . The models also control for income and wealth quartiles of all households. Again, following McGarry (1999), we include a dummy variable for whether wealth is high enough to exceed the threshold for taxing bequeathable wealth, namely $600,000 if single and $1,200,000 if married.
The models also control for child-level variables that affect whether parents transfer to children or plan to divide their estate equally. The average age of adult children is about 46. We control for whether a child is a stepchild, because the bond between step-relatives may be weaker, resulting in less transfer. About 12 percent of all of the children in the sample are stepchildren (similarly, 13 percent of all households had a step child). Each adult child has on average two children (grandchildren of elderly persons). The average adult child has more than a high school education and the majority lived more than ten miles away from their parents. If parents give transfers because of altruism, then they will try to equalize the marginal utility of their children's income, so controlling for children's income and education is important. We control for child's income because transfers may be negatively related to income if the parents are altruistic.
The child income categories changed between waves. The first seven categories are categories from wave 1, while the others are from wave 2. The most common income group was income between 30,000 to 50,000 dollars or to have a missing value on income. Also in wave 2, imputed income values were used for children if their income values were missing. Imputed income was not available in wave 1, so we created a dummy variable for income missing in wave 1. Differences among children in their age or education could also explain altruistic behavior by parents in giving bequests. Therefore, following McGarry (1999) we control for the highest absolute difference in ages and education among children in the bequest model.
There is one set of instruments for each level of the analysis. The child-level instruments predict whether the child provides informal care, while also being uncorrelated with receiving inter-vivos transfers. In many societies, the burden of caring for one's parents falls to the eldest or to daughters, so a child's birth order and gender may predict informal caregiving. In addition, the child's other family responsibilities may compete for time, so marital status may predict informal caregiving. In the child-level sample, half were daughters, and approximately 70 percent were married. We created dummy variables indicating whether the daughter was the eldest, youngest, or a middle sibling (if more than two siblings). We interacted these three dummy variables with marital status, for three more instruments.
The household-level instruments predict which parents are likely to receive informal caregiving from their children, but are uncorrelated with transfers to children. Health shocks and conditions are good predictors of health care utilization, including informal care, so we created ten instruments for whether either parent (if married) reported having a problem with angina, arthritis, cancer, vision, a major fall, hip fracture, stroke, number of ADLs, number of IADLs, and days in bed in the last month. Because the 1993 wave was only of the non-institutionalized, it is important to note that the surveyed population is somewhat biased towards healthier elderly individuals (McGarry and Schoeni 1997) . Not surprisingly, in the second wave, when respondents were followed into the nursing home, average health status declined. Health problems, per se, should not influence the probability of equal bequests. Arthritis and falls were the most common problems, with more than a third of households reporting problems with each of those, and hip fracture was the least common, with only four percent.
We tested whether one can reject the hypothesis that informal care is exogenous by including in the main equation both actual informal care and the error from the first-stage regression. In the inter-vivos transfer model, the null hypothesis of exogeneity was not rejected, with a p-value of .91 (see Table 2 ).
Therefore, a single-equation model is preferred as long as the instruments are valid. In the intended bequest model, exogeneity was rejected with a p-value of .03. In both models the instruments are individually and jointly statistically significant in the first-stage regression (p<.0001), and the partial F -statistics were 4.47 and 46.37. We passed the overidentification test (p=.12, p=.27), which did not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments can be excluded from the main equation. Because the bequest model also has a variable for whether at least one child co-resides with the elderly parent, we also ran the model controlling for endogeneity of co-resident children. The specification tests all passed, and the results are qualitatively the same.
Results
The results at the child level show that a child who provides informal care is more likely to receive an inter-vivos transfer than a sibling who does not provide informal care (see Table 3 ). The single-equation model, appropriate if informal care is not endogenous, has a positive and statistically significant parameter for informal care. The average marginal effect is 16.3 percentage points, compared to an average probability of about .5. These results, which use variation within families that have any transfers, show that conditional on a parent making any transfers, children who provide informal care are more likely to receive monetary transfers than their siblings who do not provide care. In the logit model with household fixed effects, the average marginal effect was 11.6 percentage points (the estimated coefficient is slightly larger than in the model without fixed effects). The fixed effects model is our preferred model. These results are robust to the other specifications designed to control for the endogeneity of informal care. When informal care is replaced with lagged informal care, the coefficient is statistically significant at the five percent level, and the average marginal effect is 13.6 percentage points. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on lagged caregiving is smaller than for current caregiving in all models. Therefore, the household fixed effects models produce marginal effects in the range of 11 to 14 percentage points, with coefficients that are statistically significant. Another prediction from the theoretical framework was that the results will be stronger for younger parents. We reran all the models on subsets of the data, stratified by the minimum household age (results not shown in tables). The estimated average marginal effects were uniformly larger for younger parents.
For example, for the model with household fixed effects, the average marginal effect of informal care is 41.5 percentage points if the minimum age is between 65 and 74, but only 7.9 percentage points if the minimum age is between 75 and 84.
The second main hypothesis we tested was whether or not informal care affects the probability that a parent expects her bequest to be divided equally.
Informal care was not statistically significant in any of the models (see Table   4 ). Interestingly, the estimated coefficients and marginal effects for informal care are similar for the logit, logit with fixed effects, and logit with lagged informal care. There is no evidence to support informal care leading to unequal bequests, in contrast to our results for inter-vivos transfers. The overwhelming majority-around 95 percent-of parents who answered the question said that they expect their bequest to be divided equally, leaving relatively little variation in our data. Consequently, only one covariate was statistically significant in the models-whether there is a step child. Parents are much less likely to expect to divide their estate equally when they have stepchildren. Another consequence of relatively little variation in the dependent variable is the caveat that this analysis may have low power. The lack of statistical significance was also found in models that controlled for the endogeneity of co-resident children.
The results are robust to several changes in specification. In addition to the results presented, we also tried slightly different measures of both the dependent variable and the measure of informal care. The substantive results were the same when the dichotomous measure of transfers was replaced with a continuous measure, and when it was replaced by either transfers in the last year (greater than $500) or in the last ten years (greater than $5,000), instead of either type of transfer. The basic results were also not sensitive to whether informal care was measured as a continuous or dichotomous variable. When using dichotomous measures of either the dependent or endogenous independent variables, we tried both logit and linear probability models, and again the results were robust.
Another specification test was to see whether the results are sensitive to whether the elderly parent is single or married. In the theoretical framework we do not distinguish between married and unmarried persons. It is possible that the results would be different if the household-level data were for a single person or a married person. Estate tax laws are different if there is a surviving spouse, and care and attention from children may matter more if there is no spouse. We ran all our models on both subsets of the data, and the results are substantively the same for both married and unmarried parents (results not shown in tables).
The magnitude, statistical significance, and results of the specification tests lead to the same conclusions. Overall then we do not find that marital status changes the results.
Finally, we can compare the difference between our results and those of McGarry and Schoeni (1997) , who found no association between inter-vivos transfers and informal caregiving in single cross-sectional results. We replicated their result of no effect of informal care in a model without household-level fixed effects (N = 25, 723) that also did not condition on any inter-vivos transfers. This null result is due in part to poor controls for income and wealth. Households with little or no income or wealth are extremely unlikely to give transfers, and are more likely to need informal care due to health problems (there is a long literature on the positive relationship between economic status and health status among the elderly, see Feinstein (1993) ). Analyzing all households-including those that are unlikely to give a transfer no matter how much informal care is provided-dilutes the effect of informal care. One way to test this is to rerun the main models (without fixed effects) by wealth quartile. As expected, the coefficient on informal care increases with each wealth quartile. In addition, if wealth and income are measured with error, which is almost certainly true, and if these financial variables are correlated with informal caregiving, which is likely, then running cross-sectional analyses will lead to biased estimates. The advantage of controlling for household-level fixed effects is that the models control for the permanent component of income and wealth, and focus the analysis on those households where transfers are most likely.
Conclusions
Exchange may help explain the observed patterns of passing wealth to the next generation of children unequally when given as an inter-vivos transfer, but almost always equally when a bequest. Explaining this phenomenon is important given that hundreds of billions of dollars are bequeathed and transferred each year (Wilhelm 1996) . We argue that although exchange may be an important reason for bequests, it is better applied to transfers. Transfers can provide more targeted incentives, are less expensive to change, and can be more secretive if parents wish to keep information from other children or the public.
Our study, which directly measures exchange as a motivation for inter-vivos transfers, finds strong evidence that increases in the provision of informal care by adult children to their parents increases the likelihood of receiving a monetary transfer. We use variation within families to identify exchange. The burden of providing informal care falls disproportionately across children, with more daughters and unmarried children providing informal care. Given the inequality of informal care provision, and the advantages of transfers over bequests for exchange, it is not surprising that inter-vivos transfers are so unequally divided.
Our results are consistent with those of McGarry (1999) , who argued that altruism can explain unequal inter-vivos transfers among children but equal bequests. Although the underlying mechanism is different, exchange is another reason to observe the same general pattern. We do not argue against altruism as a motivation for inter-vivos transfers, but instead point out that there is strong evidence that exchange is an additional motivator. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Marginal effects are in brackets. Statistical significance at the 5 percent level (*) or the 1 percent level (**). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Marginal effects are in brackets. Statistical significance at the 5 percent level (*) or the 1 percent level (**).
